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This paper examines multidimensional stochastic dominance when one of the indicators 
of well-being, such as household size or place of residence, is qualitative. It also uses a 
test for strict dominance based on the empirical likelihood ratio. Empirical applications 
are based on the DHS (Demography and Health Surveys) for several countries in 
Western Africa. The results show the existence of multidimensional dominance 
relationships between most of these countries. 
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 1 Introduction
Poverty has been increasingly recognized as a multidimensional phenomenon,
in large part due to the inﬂuential work of Sen (1979, 1985, 1987). A number of
variables other than income can indeed provide important information on well-
being and poverty, such as the state of health, the level of education, ownership of
durable goods, access to basic services, etc. One set of variables that affects well-
being deals with the size and composition of the households in which individuals
live. Other variables are more geographical or describe the nature of one’s area of
residence (e.g., rural vs. urban area).
Many of those indicators of well-being other than income are qualitative and
discrete, although many of the multidimensional poverty indices found in the
literature have been implicitly or explicitly designed with continuous indicators
of well-being in mind. There have, however, been a few attempts at handling
discrete indicators of well-being, including in the context of multidimensional
dominance analysis. Atkinson (1992), Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987), Bour-
guignon (1989), Jenkins and Lambert (1993), Chambaz and Maurin (1998) and
Duclos and Makdissi (2005) provide for instance conditions explicitly designed
for making welfare and poverty dominance comparisons that take into account
differences in discrete measures of household size and composition.
Most of the above studies have focused on deriving theoretical conditions for
dominance and have usually performed poverty comparisons without taking ac-
count sampling variability. One exception is Duclos, Sahn, and Younger (2007).
The current paper extends this work by applying statistical inference techniques
based on an intersection-union approach to testing dominance, an approach that
facilitates inference of dominance (as opposed to non-dominance) relationships.
This also extends to the presence of a discrete indicator of multidimensional well-
being the work of Davidson and Duclos (2006) on the use of an empirical likeli-
hood ratio statistic.
Section 2 describes the conditions for dominance in welfare, while Section 3
examines dominance in poverty. These conditions are analogous to those found
in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987), Jenkins and Lambert (1993), Chambaz and
Maurin (1998), and Duclos, Sahn, and Younger (2007). Section 4 presents an in-
ference methodology based on the empirical likelihood ratio and on resampling
techniques. Section 5 features a few empirical illustrations of poverty compar-
isons based on the proposed method and in the context of West African countries.
The last section concludes.
22 Stochastic dominance in welfare
This section draws importantly on the work of Atkinson and Bourguignon
(1987), Jenkins and Lambert (1993), and Chambaz and Maurin (1998). We as-
sume a heterogeneous population that can be subdivided into K subgroups along
the values of a discrete indicator. We also postulate that these subgroups can be
ranked in descending order according to their marginal utility of income x. Let
uk(x) be the concave and increasing utility function of the subgroup k of house-
holds, let ϕF
k be the proportion of households of subgroup k in a total population
denoted F, such that
∑K
k=1 ϕF
k = 1, and let Fk (x) be the cumulative density
function of households in each subgroup k of a population F. The social utility











where x corresponds to the highest possible income in the population and where
Fk (x) = 1 8 k = 1,...,K. We assume that
u
(1)
1 (x)  u
(1)
2 (x)    u
(1)
K (x)  0 8 x. (2)
This says that, at the same income level x, the subgroups with greater needs (sub-
groups are ordered so that 1 is most needy and K is least needy) value an increase
in their income more than less needy subgroups. We also assume that (Jenkins
and Lambert 1993, Chambaz and Maurin 1998):
u1(x) = u2(x) =  = uK(x). (3)
Consider then another population G whose cumulative density function for K
subgroups is given by Gk (x). Let ϕG
k represent the proportion of households in
each subgroup k in population G. The condition for ﬁrst-order sequential welfare
dominance of F by G is given by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 W G > W F 8 uk(x), with k = 1,...,K, satisfying assumptions





k Fk (x)   ϕG
k Gk (x)
]
> 0 8 x and 8 L =
1,...,K.
For a proof, see Chambaz and Maurin (1998), who draw on the demonstration
in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) but relax the constraint that ϕF
k = ϕG
k .
To study second-order sequential dominance, we can postulate that:
u
(2)
1 (x)  u
(2)
2 (x)    u
(2)
K (x)  0 8 x. (4)
This says that marginal utility declines more rapidly in needier subgroups. A
condition for second-order sequential welfare dominance of F by G is then given
by Proposition 2.
3Proposition 2 W G > W F 8 uk(x), with k = 1,...,K, satisfying Assumptions







k Fk (y)   ϕG
k Gk (y)
]
dy > 0 8 x and
8 L = 1,...,K.
Jenkins and Lambert (1993) demonstrate the sufﬁciency of this condition for the
general case in which ϕF
k and ϕG
k are not necessarily equal, and Chambaz and
Maurin (1998) show its necessity.
3 Stochastic dominance in poverty
Some further assumptions are needed before we can establish conditions for
dominance in poverty. Consider ﬁrst the following sets of sequential poverty
thresholds:
Z1  Z2    Zk. (5)
This means that the poverty lines of the various subgroups can be ranked in
decreasing order, from the most needy to the least needy. In the case of groups dif-
ferentiated by household size, the neediest subgroup consists of the largest house-
holds (subgroup 1) while the least needy one is made of households of a single
individual (subgroup K). In this case, it is reasonable to assume that a house-
hold in subgroup k has at least the same level of basic needs as one in subgroup
k + 1 and, that we can therefore set for it a poverty line at least as high as that of
subgroup k + 1.




πk (x)dFk (x)dx, (6)
where πk (x) is the contribution to group k poverty of a household in subgroup k
with income level x. We have πk (x) = 0 if x  Zk. It seems natural to suppose
that, at a common income level x, an identical increase in income will affect the
poverty of a subgroup k at least as much as that of a less needy subgroup k + 1.
This is captured by the following assumption:
π
(1)
1 (x)  π
(1)
2 (x)    π
(1)
K (x)  0, 8 x. (7)
Since π1
k (x) is non-positive, this also implies the usual monotonicity axiom used
inaxiomaticdeﬁnitionsofpoverty, whichsaysthatanincreaseinanyone’sincome












with Z = (Z1,Z2,...,ZK). Let P F (Z) be the poverty measure for the entire
population F, and P G (Z) that for population G, where ∆P (Z) = P F (Z)  
P G (Z).
Let Π1 (Z) represent the class of poverty measures satisfying the assumptions







k , such that Zk  Z
+
k , 8 k. The condition for ﬁrst-order poverty domi-
nance of F by G is given by Proposition 3.












k Fk (Zk)   ϕG
k Gk (Zk)
]






and 8 L = 1,...,K.
See Jenkins and Lambert (1993) and Chambaz and Maurin (1998) for a proof.
Extending the analysis to second-order dominance, we can assume that
π
(2)
1 (x)  π
(2)
2 (x)    π
(2)
K (x)  0, 8 x. (9)
Denote as Π2 (Z) the class of poverty measures that also satisfy (9). Proposition
4 establishes the equivalence conditions for second-order dominance of F by G
in poverty.
Proposition 4 The following conditions are equivalent:



































(Z   x)dGk (x)(10)
Duclos and Makdissi (2005) provide a proof of this.
1See Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2002) and Tsui (2002) for instance for a discussion of this
and other popular axioms.
54 Statistical inference
Consider a population of size N partitioned into K subgroups by a discrete
indicator d (level of education, place of residence, household size, etc.). We also
consider a continuous indicator of well-being x (income, expenses, etc.). Let pi be
the probability associated with household i, with i = 1,...,N and
∑N
i=1 pi = 1,
and let pki be the probability associated with household i relative to subgroup k,
such that pi = ϕkpki. If we consider y to be some income level from the set
[0,x], the non-normalized cumulative distribution function for a subgroup k can
be estimated by:
  Fk (y) =
N ∑
i=1
piI (xi  y,di = k), (11)
where I() is an indicator function assuming the value of one when the condition
holds, and of zero otherwise. Assume we have two populations F and G, of
size NF and NG respectively, for which we want to compare the distributions
over (x,d). Proposition 1 states the existence of ﬁrst-order sequential welfare




  Fk (y)     Gk (y)
]
> 0 8 y and 8 L = 1,...,K. (12)




  Fk (y)     Gk (y)
]

0 for at least one pair (y,L). The tests are thus performed on the null hypothesis





  Fk (y)     Gk (y)
]






  Fk (y)     Gk (y)
]
> 0 8 y and 8 L = 1,...,K.
Davidson and Duclos (2006) suggest a method based on the empirical likeli-
hood ratio for comparing univariate distributions. This method is extended here to
bivariate distributions for which one of the dimensions is discrete. The problem


























Solving this problem yields the maximum of the unconstrained empirical like-
lihood function   EL. In a second step, equation (13) is maximized taking into


















j  L)  0 (14)
This yields the constrained empirical likelihood function   ELc. The likelihood
ratio (LR) is obtained by multiplying the difference between   EL and   ELc by 2.
It is given by:
LR(y,L) = 2

    
    
N logN   NF logNF   NG logNG
+NF(y,L)logNF(y,L) + NG(y,L)logNG(y,L)
+MF(y,L)logMF(y,L) + MG(y,L)logMG(y,L)
 [NF(y,L) + NG(y,L)]log[NF(y,L) + NG(y,L)]
 [MF(y,L) + MG(y,L)]log[MF(y,L) + MG(y,L)]

    




i=1 , Mh(y,L) = Nh Nh(y,L) and Ii(y,L) = I(xh
i 
y,dh
i  L), with h = F,G. When dealing with sequential dominance in poverty,


















j  L) = 0, with ZL 2 [0,Z
+
L].(16)
As shown in Davidson and Duclos (2006), the square of the t-statistic from
Kaur, PrakasaRao, andSingh(1994)isasymptoticallyequivalenttotheLR statis-
tic and can be used in its place. The result extends easily to the case of bivariate





  F (y,L)     G(y,L)
)2
NG   F (y,L)
(
1     F (y,L)
)
+ NF   G(y,L)
(
1     G(y,L)
).(17)
The equivalence between the two statistics is established in Proposition 5.
7Proposition 5 Under the assumption that F(y,L) = G(y,L), with F(y,L) =
L ∑
k=1
Fk(y) and G(y,L) =
L ∑
k=1
Gk(y), when N ! 1, then LR(y,L) is equivalent
to t2 (y,L).
Proof. See the appendices.
The advantage of using the likelihood ratio approach is that it also yields prob-
abilities P F
i and P G
j that can be used to draw bootstrap samples under the null of
non-dominance2. For ﬁrst-order dominance, these probabilities can be found ana-
lytically. Expressions for P F
i and P G














NF + NG   θ
+
(1   Ij(y,L))




(NF + NG)  NF(y,L)
NF(y,L) + NG(y,L)
and ϕ =
(NF + NG)  MF(y,L)
MF(y,L) + MG(y,L)
.
The statistics LR(y,L) and t(y,L) correspond to the respective minima over
all possible combinations of (y,L). If this minimum is equal to zero, then the









one negative value for certain pairs (y,L). Otherwise, dominance is possible and
bootstrap tests are performed using the approach in Davidson and Duclos (2006).
Using P F
i and P G
j , we generate 399 sample pairs for the bootstraps in the ap-
plication below. A p-value can then be computed as the proportion of bootstrap
samples for which the LR and t bootstrap statistics respectively exceed the min-
ima LR(y,L) and t(y,L) obtained from the initial samples.
There is no analytical solution for stochastic dominance of higher orders. We













j (y   x
G
j )
sIj(y,L)  0, (20)
2The statistics LR1=2(y;L) and t1=2(y;L) are asymptotically pivotal. Indeed, under the null
F(y;L) = G(y;L), LR1=2(y;L) is equivalent to t1=2(y;L) which, under the same hypothesis,
asymptotically follows N(0;1). This is also valid for their minima.
8where s+1 is the order of dominance. We let the Lagrangian (L) associated with





















































where λF,λG and µ 2 R are Lagrange multipliers. There is no analytical solution
for s  1, but there are some transformations that simplify the computation of
numerical solutions. For this, we ﬁrst need the ﬁrst-order condition from the
preceding maximization problem:











NF + NG   λF   µ(y   xG
j )sIj(y,L)
.(22)
We can now solve the problem by ﬁnding   λF and   µ:























Next we replace λF and µ by their estimates   λF and   µ in equation (21) to
obtain the probabilities   P F
i and   P G
j . These probabilities are then used to com-
pute LR. The statistic in which we are interested is given by the minimum over
the set of statistics given by all possible pairs (y,L). Extending Davidson and
Duclos (2006)’s methods, Davidson (2007) shows that, in the univariate case and
under the null hypothesis of second-order non-dominance for at least one (y), this
statistic is equivalent to the corresponding squared t-statistic. The extension to the
multivariate case is immediate.
5 Empirical Results
WeusedatafromtheDemographicandHealthSurveys(DHS)forsixWAEMU
countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger and Togo) to illustrate
the existence of sequential stochastic dominance in the presence of a discrete in-
dicator of well-being. The ﬁrst variable we consider is a multidimensional index
9of wealth calculated using factor analysis. This is estimated using multiple corre-
spondence analysis (MCA) based on 11 qualitative indicators about the ownership
of durable goods (radio, television, refrigerator, bicycle, motorcycle, car) and the
access to other goods and services (electricity, type of toilette, quality of ﬂooring,
potable water, education)3. As a discrete indicator, we use household size. We
next partition the samples into 10 groups, so that the ﬁrst consists of households
with 10 or more individuals and the tenth includes only single-individual house-
holds. Another discrete indicator considered in the study is the area of residence,
with division of the samples into two groups: those living in rural areas and those
living in urban areas. The education level of the head of household is the third
discrete indicator considered.
To perform poverty comparisons using household size as a discrete indicator,
we construct a grid of points (zy,L), 20 points for zy and 10 for L. The points
zy for the wealth dimension are given by the 20 wealth quantiles obtained after
merging the two distributions to be compared. We deﬁne L = [1,2,...,10], such
that L = 1 corresponds to households of 10 individuals or more, L = 2 to those
with 9 individuals, and so on until L = 10 for households comprising a single
individual.
Figure 1 depicts the dominance relations between the six countries. Solid ar-
rows indicate ﬁrst-order dominance and dashed arrows show second-order dom-
inance. Côte d’Ivoire dominates all other countries, followed by Mali, which
dominates the next four, and then Togo dominates the remaining three. We ob-
serve a lack of dominance between Benin and Niger, as well as between Niger and
Burkina. Second-order dominance of Côte d’Ivoire over Mali is only obtained if
we exclude households of eight or more, nine or more, and ten or more individuals
from the comparisons. In fact, a comparison limited to those households yields no
dominance relationship because the curves intersect. However, when we expand
the sample to include households with fewer than eight individuals, dominance
appears. In the case of Mali and Togo, it is by excluding households of four or
fewer individuals that we can ﬁnd dominance.
More detailed results from the tests are reported in Tables 1, 2, and 3 in the
appendices. Table 1 presents the results for ﬁrst-order dominance. The p-values
are the probabilities associated with H0, i.e. that the second country does not
sequentially dominate the ﬁrst. The LR and t-statistic results are identical. Table
2 presents the second-order dominance surface in the case of Mali-Cote d’Ivoire,
including the LR values. Values of LR equal to 0 mean that the curves intersect,
precluding the possibility of dominance around that section of the surface. Testing
for restricted dominance yields minima of 1.919 for the LR and 2.409 for the t-
statistic. The p-value obtained by the bootstrap method equals 0.000 for both
3See Greenacre (1993) and Greenacre and Blasius (2006) for more details on MCA methods.
10Figure 1: Diagram of sequential dominance between countries in the WAEMU,
with household size as a discrete indicator
statistics, sotheassumptionofnon-dominanceisrejectedwithanerrorprobability
of less than 1%. Table 3 reports the results for Togo-Mali. Here, the LR and t-
statistics are 2.193 and 2.195 respectively, with p-values also equal to 0.000.
The alternate speciﬁcation treats the place of residence as a discrete indicator.
Rural areas are assumed to be more needy that urban ones. Figure 2 shows the
dominance diagram for this case. As previously, Côte d’Ivoire sequentially dom-
inates all other countries in poverty, followed by Mali and Togo, between which
there is no dominance. We ﬁnd no dominance between Benin and Niger or be-
tween Niger and Burkina. Mali and Togo dominate Benin in the second order.
Apart from the dominance relations involving Côte d’Ivoire, other dominance re-
lations are restricted in that extreme values of zy must generally be excluded to
obtain dominance.
Detailed results for ﬁrst-order dominance are presented in Table 4 in the Ap-
pendices. Table 5 reports the results for second-order dominance.
The third speciﬁcation uses education level as the discrete variable. In doing
so, this variable is excluded from the estimation of the asset index. The education
level of the head of household consists in three categories, which are the lack of
education, primary education, and secondary education or more. Figure 3 shows
the diagram of dominance obtained in this third case. The results are close to those
from the second speciﬁcation, excepted that here Togo dominates Benin at ﬁrst-
11Figure 2: Diagram of sequential dominance between countries in WAEMU, with
place of residence as a discrete indicator
order while the latter dominates Niger at the same order. The lack of dominance
relation is still observed between Togo and Mali on the one hand, and between
Burkina and Niger, on the other hand. The detailed ﬁrst-order dominance results
are reported in Table 6.
For the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (with household size as a discrete indicator), we ob-
tain 13 dominance relations out of a total of 15 — 11 instances of ﬁrst-order and
2 of second-order dominance. For the second speciﬁcation (with place of resi-
dence as a discrete indicator), there are 12 dominance relations, including 10 of
the ﬁrst-order. Finally, for the last speciﬁcation (with education level as a discrete
indicator), there are 13 dominance relations, 12 of them being ﬁrst-order relations.
When there is dominance in the last column of the dominance surface (for ex-
ample, the last column of Table 2), dominance in the univariate case is achieved
since this abstracts from the role of the discrete indicator. Reducing the number
of classes of households, e.g., by considering the ﬁrst class of households as those
composed of 5 and more individuals, there is full dominance of Côte d’Ivoire on
Mali. Idem for the dominance of Mali on Togo (Table 3). Moreover, dominance
in welfare is more difﬁcult to observe than dominance in poverty since the former
involves the latter. For instance, in Table 3, a possible poverty dominance exclud-
ing welfare dominance would be a situation where null values tend to appear in
the bottom and the right of the table. It would be possible, in this case, to obtain
12Figure 3: Diagram of sequential dominance between countries in WAEMU, with
education level as a discrete indicator




2      Z
+
k for which poverty dominance
holds statistically, but welfare dominance does not.
6 Conclusion
Aside from income, which is typically used as an indicator of well-being, sev-
eral other variables would also seem to be able to capture important aspects of
well-being and poverty, such as household size, place of residence, or literacy.
We can often usefully think of these variables as capturing differences in house-
hold needs, and it would therefore seem preferable to take into account their dis-
tribution in conducting poverty and welfare comparisons. The discrete nature of
these variables makes them amenable to the application of sequential dominance
techniques to compare welfare and poverty, techniques derived among others by
Atkinson (1992), Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987), Jenkins and Lambert (1993),
Chambaz and Maurin (1998) and, more recently, by Duclos and Makdissi (2005)
and Duclos, Sahn, and Younger (2007).
This paper implements such sequential dominance techniques using statistical
inference methods based on the empirical likelihood ratio. This approach allows
us to test a null hypothesis of non-dominance versus an alternative hypothesis
of dominance. It therefore facilitates inference of multidimensional dominance
13relationships. Illustrations of comparisons across six West African countries are
provided using DHS data and wealth indices. The ﬁrst set of illustrations uses
household size as a discrete indicator of needs, the second set considers place of
residence as the discrete indicator of needs, and the third uses the educational level
of the head of household.
Results from bootstrap tests lead to the inference of several dominance rela-
tionships in all of these speciﬁcations. Côte d’Ivoire generally ends up dominating
all the other countries, followed by Mali and Togo. These results also suggest that
tests based on the likelihood ratio can be useful for analyzing multidimensional
poverty and welfare dominance when one of the dimensions of welfare is discrete.
7 Appendices
7.1 Proof of Proposition 5
This proof is based on that provided by Davidson and Duclos (2006). First,
an asymptotical expression of the squared t-statistic in equation (17) is derived.
Assume that F(y,L) = G(y,L) and ∆(y,L)    F(y,L)     G(y,L). Moreover,
when N ! 1, assume that NF/N ! r, where r is a constant between 0 and 1.
If N ! 1, the following equalities hold:































alent to the above statistic. Indeed, consider the statistic LR(y,L) given in equa-
tion(15). KnowingthatNF(y,L) = NFF(y,L), NG(y,L) = NGG(y,L), MF(y,L) =
NF   NF(y,L) and MG(y,L) = NG   NG(y,L), (15) could be transformed as
the sum of the two following expressions multiplied by 2:
{
 NF   F(y,L)log
(
NF b F(y;L)+NG b G(y;L)
N b F(y;L)
)
  NG   G(y,L)log
(








 NF(1     F(y,L))log
(
N (NF b F(y;L)+NG b G(y;L))
N (1  b F(y;L))
)
 NG(1     G(y,L))log
(







(27) can be rewritten as
 (NF   F(y,L) + NG   G(y,L))log(NF   F(y,L) + NG   G(y,L))
+NF   F(y,L)log(N   F(y,L)) + NG   G(y,L)log(N   G(y,L))
(29)
Introducing ∆(y,L) in (29), and knowing that ∆(y,L)    F(y,L)     G(y,L)
and therefore that NF   F(y,L)+NG   G(y,L) = N   G(y,L)+NF∆(y,L), a reduced
expression is obtained by a Taylor expansion:
NFNG∆2(y,L)




































which is equivalent to the right-hand-side expression in equation (26).
7.2 Main tables
15Table 1: First-order dominance tests, with household size as a discrete indicator
F not dominated by G LR t-statistic
LR p   value t p   value
Benin-Côte d’Ivoire 2.295 0.000*** 2.317 0.000***
Burkina-Côte d’Ivoire 2.360 0.000*** 2.377 0.000***
Niger-Côte d’Ivoire 2.337 0.000*** 2.379 0.000***
Togo-Côte d’Ivoire 3.180 0.000*** 3.259 0.000***
Benin-Mali 2.478 0.000*** 2.491 0.000***
Burkina-Mali 7.197 0.000*** 6.227 0.000***
Niger-Mali 2.656 0.025** 2.668 0.025**
Benin-Togo 2.635 0.005*** 2.512 0.005***
Burkina-Togo 4.173 0.003*** 4.071 0.003***
Niger-Togo 2.922 0.090* 2.921 0.090*
Burkina-Benin 2.584 0.035** 2.631 0.035**
16Table 2: Second-order dominance surface, Mali vs Côte d’Ivoire
Household size
zy 10 & + 9 & + 8 & + 7 & + 6 & + 5 & + 4 & + 3 & + 2 & + 1 & +
-0.46 3.88 1.13 1.21 1.92 2.51 2.54 2.51 2.99 2.99 2.99
-0.44 2.01 1.10 1.44 2.33 3.06 3.91 4.38 5.43 5.43 5.43
-0.35 1.69 0.86 1.78 2.84 4.37 6.19 6.97 8.71 8.73 8.73
-0.30 1.94 1.33 2.39 3.64 5.38 7.26 8.03 9.86 9.89 9.89
-0.17 1.05 0.67 1.56 3.12 5.02 6.95 7.68 9.62 9.60 9.60
-0.13 0.24 0.00 0.83 2.57 4.53 6.51 7.30 9.29 9.27 9.27
-0.12 0.02 0.00 0.67 2.49 4.48 6.50 7.33 9.36 9.33 9.33
-0.04 0.00 0.00 0.31 2.53 4.69 6.91 8.01 10.20 10.14 10.14
-0.03 0.00 0.00 0.30 2.58 4.77 7.02 8.16 10.38 10.32 10.32
-0.02 0.00 0.00 0.48 2.81 5.03 7.32 8.52 10.77 10.71 10.71
-0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69 3.08 5.33 7.66 8.92 11.20 11.14 11.14
0.05 0.00 0.27 1.67 4.27 6.69 9.30 10.80 13.30 13.23 13.23
0.11 0.25 0.93 2.47 5.21 7.77 10.60 12.28 14.98 14.91 14.91
0.18 0.75 1.60 3.26 6.18 8.92 12.06 14.03 16.99 16.92 16.92
0.33 1.03 2.14 4.04 7.17 10.21 13.82 16.33 19.78 19.72 19.72
0.71 1.02 2.41 4.72 8.12 11.60 15.99 19.66 24.22 24.14 24.14
1.02 0.58 2.04 4.51 7.99 11.58 16.30 20.62 25.88 25.80 25.80
1.24 0.00 1.19 3.70 7.26 10.88 15.82 20.60 26.43 26.35 26.35
1.52 0.00 0.00 2.42 6.04 9.65 14.81 20.12 26.70 26.62 26.62
1.82 0.00 0.00 0.92 4.54 8.10 13.46 19.29 26.78 26.70 26.70
17Table 3: Second-order dominance surface, Togo vs Mali
Household size
zy 10 & + 9 & + 8 & + 7 & + 6 & + 5 & + 4 & + 3 & + 2 & + 1 & +
-0.47 2.40 3.04 3.29 3.56 3.45 2.75 2.95 2.64 2.64 2.64
-0.45 4.68 5.68 6.37 5.16 5.76 4.61 4.01 2.91 2.91 2.91
-0.39 4.61 5.48 6.11 5.71 4.98 2.81 1.43 0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.34 4.62 5.50 5.99 5.67 4.70 2.32 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.31 5.03 6.00 6.29 5.96 4.83 2.34 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.24 7.15 8.46 8.79 8.67 7.72 5.50 3.75 1.11 1.16 1.16
-0.19 8.66 10.12 10.50 10.49 9.64 7.65 5.93 3.30 3.36 3.36
-0.14 10.29 11.83 12.28 12.35 11.62 9.82 8.11 5.53 5.60 5.60
-0.12 10.70 12.25 12.72 12.76 12.05 10.30 8.56 5.98 6.06 6.06
-0.05 11.40 12.89 13.35 13.23 12.48 10.75 8.80 6.27 6.37 6.37
-0.03 11.52 12.97 13.42 13.24 12.49 10.77 8.76 6.23 6.34 6.34
-0.01 11.40 12.78 13.16 12.93 12.14 10.39 8.31 5.76 5.88 5.88
0.01 11.04 12.30 12.60 12.27 11.43 9.60 7.40 4.76 4.89 4.89
0.09 9.95 10.96 11.17 10.63 9.75 7.72 5.29 2.41 2.56 2.56
0.14 9.18 10.04 10.22 9.58 8.67 6.54 3.96 0.91 1.09 1.09
0.23 8.14 8.78 8.94 8.23 7.31 5.13 2.32 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.38 7.10 7.49 7.69 6.88 5.96 3.79 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.76 5.84 5.90 6.14 5.29 4.47 2.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.14 5.44 5.35 5.56 4.79 4.08 2.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.60 5.27 5.07 5.30 4.67 4.11 2.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
18Table4: First-orderdominancetests, withplaceofresidenceasadiscreteindicator
F not dominated by G LR-statistic t-statistic Type of
(F-G) LR p-value t p-value dominance
Benin-Côte d’Ivoire 1.545 0.000*** 1.539 0.000*** no restriction
Burkina-Côte d’Ivoire 5.466 0.000*** 5.021 0.000*** no restriction
Niger-Côte d’Ivoire 7.150 0.000*** 5.573 0.000*** no restriction
Togo-Côte d’Ivoire 4.358 0.000*** 5.303 0.000*** no restriction
Mali-Côte d’Ivoire 4.463 0.000*** 4.665 0.000*** no restriction
Burkina-Mali 6.244 0.098* 6.359 0.100* restricted
Niger-Mali 7.391 0.000*** 7.232 0.000*** restricted
Burkina-Togo 6.396 0.000*** 6.230 0.000*** restricted
Niger-Togo 7.360 0.040** 7.301 0.040** restricted
Burkina-Benin 4.312 0.013** 4.351 0.013** restricted
Table 5: Second-order dominance tests, with place of residence as a discrete indi-
cator
F not dominated by G LR-statistic t-statistic
(F-G) LR p-value t p-value
Benin-Mali 1.998 0.000*** 2.000 0.000***
Benin-Togo 2.811 0.000*** 2.813 0.000***
19Table 6: First-order dominance tests, with education level as a discrete indicator
F not dominated by G LR-statistic t-statistic Type of
(F-G) LR p-value t p-value dominance
Benin-Côte d’Ivoire 6.073 0.000*** 5.649 0.000*** no restriction
Burkina-Côte d’Ivoire 4.987 0.000*** 4.0784 0.000*** no restriction
Mali-Côte d’Ivoire 2.279 0.000*** 2.314 0.000*** no restriction
Niger-Côte d’Ivoire 8.250 0.000*** 6.339 0.000*** no restriction
Togo-Côte d’Ivoire 2.752 0.000*** 2.742 0.000*** restricted
Benin-Togo 2.920 0.003*** 2.942 0.003*** restricted
Burkina-Togo 5.516 0.000*** 5.409 0.000*** restricted
Niger-Togo 6.423 0.063* 6.373 0.063* restricted
Burkina-Mali 9.200 0.000*** 8.366 0.000*** restricted
Niger-Mali 7.177 0.000*** 7.026 0.000*** restricted
Burkina-Benin 3.786 0.005*** 3.846 0.005*** restricted
Niger-Benin 3.951 0.058* 4.001 0.058* restricted
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